Stirring up the wasps nest of Kathryn Porter Supporters
Recently, I pushed back against Kathryn Porter's narratives attacking the UK's Net Zero ambitions and leadership globally on Net Zero.
See my LinkedIn post about it here:
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/david-calver-8974ab_climate-sceptic-goes-unchallenged-on-bbc-activity-7384498887706902528-MURq?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAASqTMBF8LZwGbXnDyltwGdPsLAWhrESDE
Porter is well known for her controversial narratives about Net Zero and renewable energies.
For example, see this from Summer 2025:
https://www.desmog.com/2025/05/20/tory-shadow-minister-lord-offord-launches-oil-consultant-kathryn-porter-anti-net-zero-report/
and this from 2023:
https://www.desmog.com/2023/06/22/climate-sceptic-goes-unchallenged-on-bbcs-today-programme/
I didn't expect there to be quite as much pushback as there was. It seemed that I had poked a wasps nest of her supporters. They came swarming out of their echo chambers in large numbers, attacked my comments and defended hers.
This is one example of the push-back against the drive for sustainability - in this instance against the decarbonisation of the global economy.
The pushback appears to be getting a lot of support from those on the right of the political spectrum. In the UK, until recently, there was broad and deep cross-party support for decarbonisation and Net Zero. That political consensus lasted a few decades, during which the 2008 UK Climate Change Act was passed, committing the UK to stringent Net Zero targets. It's a shame that, in the last year or so, that consensus has fractured, with the right and far-right parties copying large parts of the "MAGA" (Make America Great Again) movement's agenda, that brought Trump to power in the USA. With his "drill baby drill" mentality, Trump has led a pushback against Net Zero and decarbonisation of economies.
That sort of "Me/us first" narrative is something I've seen and heard all my life. Some people are particularly attracted to it when they feel that their way of life is threatened, eg by the perception that "they" (ie "not me/us") are making things worse. "They" could be:
- the left
- immigrants
- academics
- scientists
- other experts
That overtly political tactic, of othering, blaming and scapegoating segments of the community has been repeated throughout history, most notably and heinously in the rise of fascism under the guise of "National Socialism" in 1930s Germany.
However, for a political movement (eg the right / nationalists / populists) to be succeeding, at least in part (see Reform's rise in the polls in the last couple of years) with such a narrative, there must be a crumb of truth, or at least an amount of genuine concern at the core of it, that such movements feed on to enable them to rise to power.
So, we need to address the core concerns that are feeding the pushback. What are they?
1) A realisation that lack of economic growth is a real and present problem
When economic growth slows down, people naturally get worried that their financial security (jobs, pensions etc) are put at risk. The decarbonisation transition is adding to that by hastening the loss of fossil fuel jobs, and many fossil fuel workers will find it hard to take advantage of the growing numbers of jobs in decarbonised energy, especially if they've nailed their colours to the anti-AGW anti-Net-Zero mast in the meantime. That's one reason the rear-guard (such as Porter) protecting the fossil fuel industry in its death throes are under pressure to push back. Crying out against the dying of the light.
Ways to tackle that concern include leaning into the decarbonisation transition, accelerating the creation of good green jobs in renewables in place of the inevitable loss of jobs as the fossil fuel sector declines further.
2) A fear that production and jobs are moving to other countries. In the pushback narrative, this is tied to claims of 'higher emissions' in other countries, because of their lower environmental standards and weaker (or non-existent) Net Zero plans.
Ways to address that pushback include proper carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments making it a level playing field internationally, and leadership in Net Zero. That all encourages manufacturing production to take place in countries where it can be done with lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions. By mid-century, if we achieve Global Net Zero, all manufacturing production will be done without any GHG emissions, on a net basis, wherever it takes place in the world. If those supporting the pushback narrative, including Porter, want to stop such jobs in the UK going to other countries (or to "reshore them"), then they should be supporting carbon taxes and the acceleration of the achievement of Net Zero in the UK, and the implementation of Net Zero plans in other countries. I don't see Porter and her supporters doing that, which means that their use of their pushback narrative is likely to be political expediency and populism rather than a genuine line of argument.
3) A false narrative around energy poverty being made worse by the decarbonisation transition globally. It sets up a false either-or.
The narrative claims that renewables contribute to energy poverty, or at least don't help to solve it.
This conflation is an attempt to paint fossil fuels as the saviour. It usually involves pointing out how much fossil fuels have contributed to past development and progress (a harking to past golden times). What that line or reasoning omits is that the past fossil fuel age drove AGW (human-driven climate change) and will continue to do so at ever increasing pace if the pushback against the decarbonisation transition succeeds. Not to mention climate tipping points (which I've written about extensively elsewhere).
One of the ways of dealing with that pushback is to reference studies such as Ekins and Zenghelis (2021) "the costs and benefits of environmental sustainability", from which:
"... the short-term GDP impacts of well-designed environmental action could be positive, crowding-in rather than ‘crowding out’ the drivers of future growth. Moreover, much environmental harm is irreversible, most obviously biodiversity loss and tipping points associated with a changing climate. This paper provides evidence that not only makes the environmental case for action, in terms of its benefits for human health and welfare, it also shows how such action can generate economic returns in terms of productivity, jobs and income and reduce the costs of meeting any emissions and resource use targets. A cost-effective low-carbon, resource-efficient transition can generate a cleaner, quieter, more secure, innovative, and productive economy for all countries at all stages of development."
It's also important to realise that energy poverty is just poverty. When implementing measures relating to the energy transition, governments can enact policy mechanisms that make the transition cash-neutral for the poorest households. Whenever people on the political right try to blame renewables for energy poverty (ie poverty) they are using a false narrative to gain political support.
4) A false narrative that developing countries would be better off tackling their energy poverty through exploiting fossil fuels rather than renewables.
While that might be the case, in the short term, for a small number of fossil-rich developing countries, it's short-sighted and risks driving them down a cul-de-sac, especially when increasing numbers of countries implement Net Zero targets and associated policies, for example carbon taxes and border carbon adjustments. Countries going down the fossil fuel cul-de-sac risk following Russia into dependence on fossil fuels through the remaining decades of ever-declining importance and ever-increasing costliness and irrelevance of fossil fuels. For many other developing countries, there is a real opportunity to leap-frog fossil fuels altogether and go for renewables to solve their energy poverty. It's not an either-or between economic development and decarbonisation, as Ekins and Zenghelis (2021) points out. One of the challenges for developing countries is that, despite the clear economic advantages of decarbonising energy, it's difficult for them to secure capital investment to make it happen. If Porter and her supporters are really concerned about addressing energy poverty in developing countries, they should support the Loss and Damages ("L&D") initiative of the UNFCCC and the CoP process. L&D provides funding from prosperous countries, who have largely caused the AGW problem, to contribute into a fund to help developing countries to deal with it.
5) Ultimately, an important question is whether we want to exploit people in other countries (part of putting ourselves first), or cooperate with them on important world-wide issues such as how to respond to stagnant global economic growth (not by growth at any cost, I suggest), climate change, poverty, energy poverty and inequalities?
This comes down to whether, in times of trouble, we vere towards xenophobia, isolationism, putting our country first to an excessive degree and putting walls up against "others", or whether we recognise that there are many worldwide problems that are better tackled by working together with each other rather than in competitive or expoitative ways.
Will individuals, movements and societies become more fearful and protective, and pushback against global cooperation, or will the sustainabilitarians, environmentalists and movements for climate stabilisation and social justice successfully push through the pushbacks?
Further misdirections from Porter in late 2025 and early 2026 which I address further in numbered sections below:
6) (Porter:) "So you think we should harm people today to try to prevent potential harm in the future? When the future harm is uncertain, as is our ability to prevent it. Renewables cause harm. They require lots of additional mining which creates pollution and illness in developing nations where the minerals are located and their low energy density means you need comparatively more of them
And they are intermittent. In GB wind has a capacity factor of 35% and solar just 10%. They are a huge waste of both capital and natural resources. Nuclear is a far superior solution, supported by gas. But we don't only use hydrocarbons for energy. Modern agriculture, technology and medicine rely on them. If we stopped producing oil and gas tomorrow, globally, there would be widespread famine as agricultural yields would fall 40%. Most industry would collapse. Medicine would go back centuries as most drugs are made from petchems
Suggesting we can do without oil and gas is a naive proposition born of privilege. Try living 1 day without touching anything made from or brought to your possession by oil or gas. Short of sitting naked in your garden fasting I bet you can't."
Rebuttals to each substantive claim in 6):
6.1) "Renewables cause harm"
Misinformation. Yes, REs cause harm, but fossil energies cause much more harm, including AGW.
6.2) "... lower energy density..."
Misdirection.
Irrelevant to the economic calculations. What matters is energy output for economic investment. Land use is important, but there is more than enough, eg low-quality agricultural land, to deploy as much solar and wind as we need.
6.3) "... intermittent... capacity factor .."
Addressed through the mix of energy sources, demand side management, interconnectors, storage, deliberate over-capacity.
It's not rocket science. UK grid update (needed anyway) and reconfiguration is 'in the pipeline' already, if you'll excuse the pun.
6.4) On nuclear energy, I partially agree with Porter (which is rare) - nuclear might well be part of the answer, alongside renewables and a small amount of gas with CCS.
6.5) "... we don't only use hydrocarbons for energy... "
Yes, and we can continue to use hydrocarbons for purposes other than energy, even after Net Zero is achieved. The decarbonisation transition doesn't need to stop that non-energy use. Porter uses a strawman argument.
7) Porter: It's also less windy this year [2025], so despite more capacity there has been less wind generation across Europe. It's not just a constraint issue it's a less wind and wake effects issue"
Rebuttal:
In relation to the UK, at least, Porter's claim is only partially correct. Below is a Google AI summary in response to the request "how windy was the UK in 2025 compared with previous years?":
"The UK's 2025 was a mixed bag for windiness: it featured incredibly powerful storms like Storm Éowyn in January, a significant wind event, but also periods of calmer weather, with overall monthly deviations fluctuating, but with strong winds contributing to record wind power generation and a relatively high number of named storms compared to normal years, despite the overall picture suggesting slightly less wind on average for some months, but more intense extremes."
Note what it says about "record wind power generation" in the UK.
When it comes to overall trends in UK wind resource (average wind speeds), it is actually a nuanced picture. Although one or two recent timespans have had slightly lower than average wind speeds, that has more than been made up by the increased installed capacity of wind energy infrastructure. Also, it's more than likely that average UK wind speeds will return to the long term average trend line in future years.
UK Government data on UK average wind speeds, compared with long term trends (at least 20 years) can be found here:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/693ab88e6a12691d48491e0d/ET_7.2_DEC_25.xlsx
The attached is a chart summarising the recent divergences from the long term UK average wind speed, in knots.
For Europe as a whole, in response to the question "what are the long term average wind speed statistics for europe?" a Google AI summary is:
"Across Europe, long-term average wind speeds are generally higher in northern Europe and coastal areas than in southern and inland regions. The annual average wind speed for Europe as a whole typically remains close to its 30-year average, though significant regional and year-to-year variations occur. "
For Europe as a whole, it is a nuanced picture, and the average wind speed for the whole of Europe is currently about the same as the long-term average.
In response to the question "what are the current and long term average wind speed statistics for europe?" a Google AI response is shown below.
"Current Wind Speed Conditions (Early to Mid-2025)
Recent reports for 2025 indicate a notable shift in windiness, with a wind drought affecting key areas of central and southern Europe.
- Below-average wind conditions were prevalent across much of Europe in the first half of 2025, especially in regions with high wind power capacity like Germany, Spain, France, and the UK.
- Some parts of Norway and Sweden experienced above-average wind speeds due to specific atmospheric patterns.
- For the UK specifically, the average wind speed in November 2025 was 8.8 knots [which matches the figure in the UK Govt chart shown above] (approximately 4.5 m/s), which was below the 20-year average.
Historical Annual Anomaly Examples
Annual average wind speeds can vary significantly from year to year relative to the long-term mean (typically the 1991-2020 reference period):
- 2022: The annual average wind speed for Europe as a whole was virtually equal to the 30-year average, with below-average speeds in western/central Europe and above-average speeds in eastern/southeastern Europe.
- 2021: Parts of northwestern and central Europe experienced some of the lowest annual average wind speeds since at least 1979, with anomalies as much as 10% below average in some places.
- 2024 (UK): The average wind speed was 8.4 knots (approx. 4.3 m/s), 0.3 knots lower than the 20-year average. "
Whether these divergences from longer term averages are just short term variability or part of a change in longer term averages is yet to be determined.
However, Porter suggests/infers a link to "wake issues", presumably inferring that those are slowing down average wind speeds.
Here, Porter is using a form of misinformation - using a true fact but inferring an effect beyond what is proven.
Again, Google AI provides a straightforward summary:
"... there is evidence that wind farms slow down wind speeds, but this effect is primarily local and regional, not global. Wind turbines extract kinetic energy from the wind to generate electricity, which inherently causes the air flow to slow down within and downwind of the wind farm, a phenomenon known as the "wake effect"."
Porter's claim of "It's also less windy this year [2025], so despite more capacity there has been less wind generation across Europe" is only partially correct. It is misleading, because it implies that there has been less wind across Europe, on average, than the long term trend. The data contradicts her obvious implication. It's true that there have been variations locally, in some European countries, that have affected their wind energy production in 2025 and some other recent years. But there is no evidence that it is part of a change in the long-term average wind speed for Europe, which is what sensible energy infrastructure planning should be based on.
The UK, as an example, is engaged in a clear and decisive expansion of wind energy and other renewables, as part of its pathway to Net Zero by 2050.
The chart below, from Cladco and National Grid, shows that the renewables share of the UK energy mix has been climbing for the last ten years, and the fossil fuel share has been declining. The trend is quite clear - the decarbonisation transition is well under way. Of course, there will be better and worse seasons or years for wind resource, but that's why the various methods of coping with variabilities are important, for example interconnectors, energy storage, gas with CCS for use when needed for short timespans, a mix of renewables, demand side management etc. The energy system of the future is more complicated than the fossil fuel centric one of the past. But the need for the transition is also very clear - to address human-driven climate change (AGW). Do you have alternative suggestions for how to tackle AGW?
The UK, as an example, is engaged in a clear and decisive expansion of wind energy and other renewables, as part of its pathway to Net Zero by 2050.
The chart below, from Cladco and National Grid, shows that the renewables share of the UK energy mix has been climbing for the last ten years, and the fossil fuel share has been declining. The trend is quite clear - the decarbonisation transition is well under way. Of course, there will be better and worse seasons or years for wind resource, but that's why the various methods of coping with variabilities are important, for example interconnectors, energy storage, gas with CCS for use when needed for short timespans, a mix of renewables, demand side management etc. The energy system of the future is more complicated than the fossil fuel centric one of the past. But the need for the transition is also very clear - to address human-driven climate change (AGW). Do you have alternative suggestions for how to tackle AGW?
From Porter:
8) " David Calver my alternative is nuclear. But my comment was factual... Wind output is down despite more capacity this year. This should be a point of concern. Perhaps it's a blip but if it's a trend or if its not that rare then we could be pretty exposed in the coming years. As it is, with 12 GW firm generation at risk of retirement in the next 5 years, I think we're taking a lot of risk. We should not decarbonise at all if we can't do so securely and at reasonable cost... actually I have a track record of pointing out the high costs of renewables and the lies we are told about how "cheap" they are. I also pointed out that if the IPCC admits 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming compared with observable data, perhaps the models aren't very good...
I think we're in trouble with few good options
We have 12 GW firm generation at risk of retiring in the next 5 yrs. But lead times for gas turbines are 7-8 yrs, nuclear is longer (8.5 years is the best KEPCO has managed) so what are we going to do to meet demand on low wind days?
Probably rationing and maybe a return to coal... Coal turbines are available in c3 yrs
I'm not at all happy with that prospect but people die in blackouts... A recent study suggests 160 excess deaths due to the Iberian blackout in April. Even coal is better than that and I am not a supporter of coal (although it's cleaner than wood pellet biomass and we're happy to burn that).
To minimise the risks we need an urgent plan to upgrade the gas fleet, extending life where possible, securing replacements ASAP and cutting nuclear regulation to accelerate new reactors. I would simply legislate away most of the existing regulation and appoint the Koreans to import theirs and build their tech. They are in all the relevant international nuclear treaties so this would not compromise safety.
What we can't do is hope hydrogen, batteries, CCS or unicorns will miraculously appear in the market at scale, on time and for an affordable price."
My responses:
8.1) I think many people are of the view that nuclear is probably going to be part of the energy mix.
8.2) Porter suggests, re UK wind resource:
"Wind output is down despite more capacity this year."
That is demonstrably false. See this from the BBC in 2026:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cz947djd3d3o
from which:
"Wind generated more than 85TWh - nearly 30% - of Great Britain's electricity last year [2025], up slightly on 2024, according to analysis of Neso data."
8.3) Porter suggests:
"Perhaps it's a blip but if it's a trend or if its not that rare then we could be pretty exposed in the coming years"
Historical data suggests there is some natural variability in wind resource from year to year (see also my detailed responses further above), which is why the energy system of the future will be more complicated than the old fossil-fuel-centric one. It will need interconnectors, storage, demand side management, a mix of renewables, a little gas with CCS.
8.4) (Porter:) "if the IPCC admits 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming compared with observable data, perhaps the models aren't very good".
That's an argument of impossible expectations. See:
https://skepticalscience.com/history-flicc-5-techniques-science-denial.html
Climate models are getting better all the time, and are a sound basis for good policy decisions. See:
https://science.nasa.gov/earth/climate-change/study-confirms-climate-models-are-getting-future-warming-projections-right/
AI summary:
"The claim that 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming is misleading; it refers to a specific, short 15-year period (1998-2012) where natural climate variability caused a temporary slowdown in surface warming, a phenomenon known as the "hiatus". When viewed over longer, more scientifically significant timescales (e.g., several decades), climate models as a whole accurately predict the observed warming trend.
Context of the Claim
The statistic comes from the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, which noted that most simulations showed a larger surface warming trend during the period of 1998-2012 than was observed in reality.
This discrepancy was largely attributed to natural, short-term climate variability, such as a series of small volcanic eruptions and an unusual amount of heat being absorbed by the deep ocean, which temporarily masked the underlying long-term warming trend.
Over a longer, more representative 112-year period (1900-2012), the average observed warming trend was almost exactly in line with the average trend projected by the models"
8.5) (Porter:) "UK emissions are only 0.8% of global emissions and we're creating environmental, social and economic harm trying to reduce them further when the climate benefit will be negligible."
That's an example of misinformation - a true fact that is misleading. The UK emissions are a small percentage of global emissions, but if all countries with small emissions took the same attitude, climate change would not be solved. It's a weak argument for inaction.
Also, this is from Google AI:
"Yes, the UK's territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are a small fraction (around 1%) of global annual emissions, but its overall carbon footprint, including emissions from imported goods and services, is much larger, placing it higher in global rankings, and its historical responsibility for emissions is significant, making its domestic actions crucial for leading by example and influencing global climate efforts."
8.6) (Porter:) "We have 12 GW firm generation at risk of retiring in the next 5 yrs. But lead times for gas turbines are 7-8 yrs, nuclear is longer (8.5 years is the best KEPCO has managed) so what are we going to do to meet demand on low wind days? Probably rationing and maybe a return to coal.."
Renewables are scalable faster than many other options (including fossil fuels) and variability is dealt with via interconnectors, storage, mix of renewables, building overcapacity, demand management and, yes, a small amount of gas (which should have CCS fitted in future).
AI summary:
"The most scalable energy technologies "at speed" are solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power.
These technologies are being deployed at an unprecedented, exponential rate globally, primarily due to their low cost, modular "lego" design, and quick installation times compared to traditional power sources like nuclear or large fossil fuel plants."
Porter's concern about costs is really (I think) about the costs of changes to the grid infrastructure during the decarbonisation transition. That is a legitimate thing to be concerned about. And I see she has written about that extensively elsewhere, as many others have.
8.7) Re Porter's reference to the Iberian blackout, from what I've read about that so far, it seems that the blackout was caused by problems with some of the grid technologies, not with the renewables feeding the grid (which is what some anti-renewables campaigners have claimed).
What that incident reinforces is that the decarbonisation transition needs to run alongside changes to the grid and to grid tech.
There is a moral argument that the cost of transitioning the energy systems should be borne by the fossil fuel companies, whose products are the main cause of AGW.
9) (Porter:) "One of my bugbears is that the industry surrendered the narrative to the green lobby without fighting back. The public needs to understand the benefits as well as risks of hydrocarbons."
Porter is drawing heavily on the "look what fossil fuels have done for us" argument. It ignores the fact that many of those benefits are benefits of energy, not benefits of fossil fuel energy per-se. And now that we know we can produce decarbonised energy, we can get those same benefits without the downsides of fossil fuel energies (eg AGW).
9.1) (Porter:) "Oil and gas are essential to modern medicine, modern technology and modern agriculture. If we stopped producing them tomorrow we would see widespread famine, and a collapse of medical systems across the world. Industry would immediately stop as steel and glass furnaces close, petchem businesses close and even factories making wind and solar equipment would close."
Porter is clearly using a strawman argument. Nobody is advocating shutting down fossil fuel energy immediately. But most are advocating for a rapid transition to decarbonised energies (eg as part of Net Zero by 2050).
9.2) (Porter:) "Almost all power generation would stop since even renewables rely on things like oil based lubricants."
Lubricants can be produced without burning fossil fuels. Porter's argument is a specious distraction and smokescreen as part of her strawman against the decarbonisation transition.
9.3) (Porter:) "The people who shout most about stopping oil do so from a position of huge privilege. They have never know insecure energy or lack of access to modern healthcare, or food insecurity. If they had, they wouldn't be so stupid."
Energy access and food security are genuine areas for concern. They can be addressed by, and during, the energy decarbonisation transition. Porter presents a false dichotomy.
Google AI summary on the question "are global energy access and food security addressed by the energy decarbonisation transition?"
"Yes, the energy decarbonisation transition can positively address global energy access and food security, but it also presents significant challenges and requires integrated, well-planned policies to ensure these goals are met equitably. The transition helps by mitigating climate change and introducing new technologies, but must be managed carefully to avoid unintended consequences."
9.4) "Without subsidies there would be no wind built in the UK. Wind and solar receive huge hidden subsidies in the form of grid connections parti offshore... If you develop a new oil or gas field in the N Sea you need to build the pipeline that brings it to shore. Build a windfarm and consumers pay for the wires to bring the electricity to shore"
I address this in section 10.18 below.
9.5) "Wind and solar have low energy density and intermittency that both impose costs on consumers rather than the developers."
I address this in sections 6.2 and 6.3 above.
9.6) "They are extremely expensive as a result. The full system costs of renewables are higher than anything else including nuclear."
I address this in section 10.18 below.
9.7) "Gas prices are lower than the when Russia invaded Ukraine and are expected to revert to pre covid averages this year as the global gas market returns to length."
That is true, but it does not address the fact that gas prices will continue to be volatile, eg vulnerable to more spikes as world events similar to the Russian invasion of Ukraine occur in future. Renewables are not as vulnerable to such events.
9.8) "Wholesale electricity prices are inflated by carbon costs which have doubled in the past year and are now 25% of the wholesale power price. This is yet another policy cost consumers are forced to pay."
I address that in section 10.18 below.
9.9) "The narratives that renewables are cheap and gas is expensive are dishonest. They fail to account for the full costs to consumers and rely on emotional manipulation."
The future planning outlooks suggest, quite rightly, that once the decarbonisation transition is complete, renewables will provide the cheapest energy. Yes, there is an issue about how to finance the inevitable transitional costs. There are various options for that. But the need to decarbonise is clear, because of AGW caused mainly by fossil energies. And the costs (impacts of AGW) avoided by decarbonising far outweigh the costs of transitioning.
With regard to her claim that renewables narratives "rely on emotional manipulation", see my comments about her own attempts at such a ploy in section 10.9 below.
8) " David Calver my alternative is nuclear. But my comment was factual... Wind output is down despite more capacity this year. This should be a point of concern. Perhaps it's a blip but if it's a trend or if its not that rare then we could be pretty exposed in the coming years. As it is, with 12 GW firm generation at risk of retirement in the next 5 years, I think we're taking a lot of risk. We should not decarbonise at all if we can't do so securely and at reasonable cost... actually I have a track record of pointing out the high costs of renewables and the lies we are told about how "cheap" they are. I also pointed out that if the IPCC admits 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming compared with observable data, perhaps the models aren't very good...
I think we're in trouble with few good options
We have 12 GW firm generation at risk of retiring in the next 5 yrs. But lead times for gas turbines are 7-8 yrs, nuclear is longer (8.5 years is the best KEPCO has managed) so what are we going to do to meet demand on low wind days?
Probably rationing and maybe a return to coal... Coal turbines are available in c3 yrs
I'm not at all happy with that prospect but people die in blackouts... A recent study suggests 160 excess deaths due to the Iberian blackout in April. Even coal is better than that and I am not a supporter of coal (although it's cleaner than wood pellet biomass and we're happy to burn that).
To minimise the risks we need an urgent plan to upgrade the gas fleet, extending life where possible, securing replacements ASAP and cutting nuclear regulation to accelerate new reactors. I would simply legislate away most of the existing regulation and appoint the Koreans to import theirs and build their tech. They are in all the relevant international nuclear treaties so this would not compromise safety.
What we can't do is hope hydrogen, batteries, CCS or unicorns will miraculously appear in the market at scale, on time and for an affordable price."
My responses:
8.1) I think many people are of the view that nuclear is probably going to be part of the energy mix.
8.2) Porter suggests, re UK wind resource:
"Wind output is down despite more capacity this year."
That is demonstrably false. See this from the BBC in 2026:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cz947djd3d3o
from which:
"Wind generated more than 85TWh - nearly 30% - of Great Britain's electricity last year [2025], up slightly on 2024, according to analysis of Neso data."
8.3) Porter suggests:
"Perhaps it's a blip but if it's a trend or if its not that rare then we could be pretty exposed in the coming years"
Historical data suggests there is some natural variability in wind resource from year to year (see also my detailed responses further above), which is why the energy system of the future will be more complicated than the old fossil-fuel-centric one. It will need interconnectors, storage, demand side management, a mix of renewables, a little gas with CCS.
8.4) (Porter:) "if the IPCC admits 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming compared with observable data, perhaps the models aren't very good".
That's an argument of impossible expectations. See:
https://skepticalscience.com/history-flicc-5-techniques-science-denial.html
Climate models are getting better all the time, and are a sound basis for good policy decisions. See:
https://science.nasa.gov/earth/climate-change/study-confirms-climate-models-are-getting-future-warming-projections-right/
AI summary:
"The claim that 111 out of 114 climate models overstate warming is misleading; it refers to a specific, short 15-year period (1998-2012) where natural climate variability caused a temporary slowdown in surface warming, a phenomenon known as the "hiatus". When viewed over longer, more scientifically significant timescales (e.g., several decades), climate models as a whole accurately predict the observed warming trend.
Context of the Claim
The statistic comes from the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, which noted that most simulations showed a larger surface warming trend during the period of 1998-2012 than was observed in reality.
This discrepancy was largely attributed to natural, short-term climate variability, such as a series of small volcanic eruptions and an unusual amount of heat being absorbed by the deep ocean, which temporarily masked the underlying long-term warming trend.
Over a longer, more representative 112-year period (1900-2012), the average observed warming trend was almost exactly in line with the average trend projected by the models"
8.5) (Porter:) "UK emissions are only 0.8% of global emissions and we're creating environmental, social and economic harm trying to reduce them further when the climate benefit will be negligible."
That's an example of misinformation - a true fact that is misleading. The UK emissions are a small percentage of global emissions, but if all countries with small emissions took the same attitude, climate change would not be solved. It's a weak argument for inaction.
Also, this is from Google AI:
"Yes, the UK's territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are a small fraction (around 1%) of global annual emissions, but its overall carbon footprint, including emissions from imported goods and services, is much larger, placing it higher in global rankings, and its historical responsibility for emissions is significant, making its domestic actions crucial for leading by example and influencing global climate efforts."
8.6) (Porter:) "We have 12 GW firm generation at risk of retiring in the next 5 yrs. But lead times for gas turbines are 7-8 yrs, nuclear is longer (8.5 years is the best KEPCO has managed) so what are we going to do to meet demand on low wind days? Probably rationing and maybe a return to coal.."
Renewables are scalable faster than many other options (including fossil fuels) and variability is dealt with via interconnectors, storage, mix of renewables, building overcapacity, demand management and, yes, a small amount of gas (which should have CCS fitted in future).
AI summary:
"The most scalable energy technologies "at speed" are solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power.
These technologies are being deployed at an unprecedented, exponential rate globally, primarily due to their low cost, modular "lego" design, and quick installation times compared to traditional power sources like nuclear or large fossil fuel plants."
Porter's concern about costs is really (I think) about the costs of changes to the grid infrastructure during the decarbonisation transition. That is a legitimate thing to be concerned about. And I see she has written about that extensively elsewhere, as many others have.
8.7) Re Porter's reference to the Iberian blackout, from what I've read about that so far, it seems that the blackout was caused by problems with some of the grid technologies, not with the renewables feeding the grid (which is what some anti-renewables campaigners have claimed).
What that incident reinforces is that the decarbonisation transition needs to run alongside changes to the grid and to grid tech.
There is a moral argument that the cost of transitioning the energy systems should be borne by the fossil fuel companies, whose products are the main cause of AGW.
9) (Porter:) "One of my bugbears is that the industry surrendered the narrative to the green lobby without fighting back. The public needs to understand the benefits as well as risks of hydrocarbons."
Porter is drawing heavily on the "look what fossil fuels have done for us" argument. It ignores the fact that many of those benefits are benefits of energy, not benefits of fossil fuel energy per-se. And now that we know we can produce decarbonised energy, we can get those same benefits without the downsides of fossil fuel energies (eg AGW).
9.1) (Porter:) "Oil and gas are essential to modern medicine, modern technology and modern agriculture. If we stopped producing them tomorrow we would see widespread famine, and a collapse of medical systems across the world. Industry would immediately stop as steel and glass furnaces close, petchem businesses close and even factories making wind and solar equipment would close."
Porter is clearly using a strawman argument. Nobody is advocating shutting down fossil fuel energy immediately. But most are advocating for a rapid transition to decarbonised energies (eg as part of Net Zero by 2050).
9.2) (Porter:) "Almost all power generation would stop since even renewables rely on things like oil based lubricants."
Lubricants can be produced without burning fossil fuels. Porter's argument is a specious distraction and smokescreen as part of her strawman against the decarbonisation transition.
9.3) (Porter:) "The people who shout most about stopping oil do so from a position of huge privilege. They have never know insecure energy or lack of access to modern healthcare, or food insecurity. If they had, they wouldn't be so stupid."
Energy access and food security are genuine areas for concern. They can be addressed by, and during, the energy decarbonisation transition. Porter presents a false dichotomy.
Google AI summary on the question "are global energy access and food security addressed by the energy decarbonisation transition?"
"Yes, the energy decarbonisation transition can positively address global energy access and food security, but it also presents significant challenges and requires integrated, well-planned policies to ensure these goals are met equitably. The transition helps by mitigating climate change and introducing new technologies, but must be managed carefully to avoid unintended consequences."
9.4) "Without subsidies there would be no wind built in the UK. Wind and solar receive huge hidden subsidies in the form of grid connections parti offshore... If you develop a new oil or gas field in the N Sea you need to build the pipeline that brings it to shore. Build a windfarm and consumers pay for the wires to bring the electricity to shore"
I address this in section 10.18 below.
9.5) "Wind and solar have low energy density and intermittency that both impose costs on consumers rather than the developers."
I address this in sections 6.2 and 6.3 above.
9.6) "They are extremely expensive as a result. The full system costs of renewables are higher than anything else including nuclear."
I address this in section 10.18 below.
9.7) "Gas prices are lower than the when Russia invaded Ukraine and are expected to revert to pre covid averages this year as the global gas market returns to length."
That is true, but it does not address the fact that gas prices will continue to be volatile, eg vulnerable to more spikes as world events similar to the Russian invasion of Ukraine occur in future. Renewables are not as vulnerable to such events.
9.8) "Wholesale electricity prices are inflated by carbon costs which have doubled in the past year and are now 25% of the wholesale power price. This is yet another policy cost consumers are forced to pay."
I address that in section 10.18 below.
9.9) "The narratives that renewables are cheap and gas is expensive are dishonest. They fail to account for the full costs to consumers and rely on emotional manipulation."
The future planning outlooks suggest, quite rightly, that once the decarbonisation transition is complete, renewables will provide the cheapest energy. Yes, there is an issue about how to finance the inevitable transitional costs. There are various options for that. But the need to decarbonise is clear, because of AGW caused mainly by fossil energies. And the costs (impacts of AGW) avoided by decarbonising far outweigh the costs of transitioning.
With regard to her claim that renewables narratives "rely on emotional manipulation", see my comments about her own attempts at such a ploy in section 10.9 below.
10) Response to Porter's 2025 'paper' “Electrification - can the grid cope?”
Debates about such matters are important, and much of Porter’s report tackles such matters well, in a descriptive way. However, her main conclusions and recommendations, which essentially revolve around backtracking on Net Zero and investing in fossil fuels (gas) are ill-founded and unsubstantiated. There are better solutions to the problems she identifies. Doubling down on Net Zero, with improvements in public policies, is a better response, and better evidenced, than her solution of, essentially, giving up on it.
Her recommendations, based on her assessment of “non-trivial risk of widespread disruption” (her unsubstantiated and almost completely unevidenced risk of a full system blackout by 2030 of 20-30%) would, in the main, take the country in a different direction, and lock in much unnecessary investment into assets that would increasingly become stranded assets.
10.1) In her paper, Porter reviews a lot of material and views about energy system trajectories in the UK and in some other countries (Norway, the Netherlands and Germany). She raises, or inspires, important aspects of debate about a future energy system:
- Decarbonisation to achieve Net Zero
- Adequacy of public policies to support a successful decarbonisation transition
- Energy capacity sufficiency
- Energy reliability (lack of outages / blackouts)
- Energy security of supply (in the sense of vulnerability to equipment failures and extreme weather events)
- Energy security (in the sense of vulnerability of the energy system to external attacks)
10.2) I agree with Porter’s assertion that “current [UK Net Zero by 2050] targets are unlikely to be met without significant compulsion, which brings its own political and social risks”.
I agree with the following excerpt from her report, which draws extensively on the good work of the UK Climate Change Committee (CCC):
“Overall, the UK is off track for its net-zero pathway in buildings and industry, with transport somewhere in the middle - electrification of rail was on track even before net zero targets were developed, and while there has been some progress in the electrification of car and small van transit, there is still a long way to go to meet targets for electric buses and HGVs. Recent reviews by Parliament, the International Energy Agency and the Climate Change Committee all highlight that policy delivery is lagging behind ambition, particularly for heat and industrial electrification.”
10.3) I also agree with her summary statement, from her report, that “The central policy challenge is not whether electrification is desirable, but whether it can be delivered without undermining security of supply”
She is right when she says:
“Even under optimistic assumptions for electrification, gas will continue to play a central role in ensuring security of supply, system resilience and operational flexibility during periods of peak demand and low renewable output.”
The UK government recognises this and includes it in their policy approaches.
10.4) However, much of the rest of Porter’s report, and associated posts, is political spin rather than fact-based critique. Her work is thin on data and evidence, especially in the aspects that are core to her main recommendations, which include “compromising on net zero ambitions” and expansion of fossil fuel energy generation (gas).
She says:
“Under the Government’s Clean Power 2030 (“CP2030”) framework, around 35 GW of gas-fired generation is expected to remain connected to the grid to provide capacity, flexibility and system services. This implicitly recognises that variable renewable generation alone cannot meet demand securely during low-wind winter conditions, nor can storage technologies be deployed at sufficient scale by 2030 to fully substitute for dispatchable thermal plant.”
The CP2030 framework does not explicitly state that “variable renewable generation alone cannot meet demand securely during low-wind winter conditions, nor can storage technologies be deployed at sufficient scale by 2030 to fully substitute for dispatchable thermal plant.”
What it does say is:
“Unabated gas will continue to play a back-up role throughout the transition to clean power, ensuring security of supply. This means that we will retain sufficient capacity until it can be safely replaced by low carbon technologies… This Action Plan sets out a pathway towards deploying low carbon flexible capacity technologies like long‑duration electricity storage, power carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS), and hydrogen to power, working alongside technologies such as nuclear generation, which provide round the clock reliable power… there will be periods over the year, mostly during winter and autumn, where weather conditions and higher electricity demand mean our fleet of renewables and firm generation alone are not able to meet electricity demand. Many of these periods will only be for a few hours. These short periods offer opportunities for flexible, low carbon solutions to meet our needs.
Where renewables alone are unable to meet demand for longer periods, we will enable a suite of technologies to be deployed and maintained to provide longer-duration power [supply and storage] capacity. This could be a combination of pumped hydro storage, first-of-a-kind low carbon dispatchable technologies like gas CCUS or hydrogen to power (H2P), or innovative technologies like liquid air energy storage (LAES). Whilst deploying of longer-duration technologies will help reduce unabated gas generation, we recognise the importance of gas capacity to maintain security of supply…We will see a fundamental shift in the role and frequency of unabated gas generation, moving from generating almost every day of the year, to an important backup to be used only when essential, with generation decreasing as we move towards 2030 – see figures 3-5. This is consistent with NESO’s view and aligns with the Climate Change Committee’s advice that maintaining gas capacity to use as backup is consistent with a fully decarbonised power system.”
Whether or not the framework implies what Porter is suggesting it does is a matter of interpretation. At the very least, it shows that the direction of travel is to use various low-carbon ways to help phase out unabated gas as the transition progresses.
Long duration storage is a fast-developing sector, as explained here:
https://decarbonization.visualcapitalist.com/all-commercially-available-long-duration-energy-storage-technologies-in-one-chart/
Here is another useful source on the subject:
https://cen.acs.org/energy/energy-storage-/search-long-duration-energy-storage/103/i5
Porter places no confidence in the advances, scaling up and commercial viability of these technology developments.
It seems likely that at least one, and perhaps several, long duration storage solutions will be commercially viable and will be implemented at scale by 2050, perhaps even by 2030. In contrast, Porter assumes that none of them will be, which would seem implausible.
10.5) Porter makes a very clear implied link between her argument for increased UK gas generation capacity and ‘public safety’, citing the Iberian blackout of 2025, but without demonstrating how an increase in UK gas generation capacity would reduce the risk of a blackout in the UK of similar scale and impact to the Iberian example.
10.6) She tries to make an affordability point on heating.
Porter says:
“In heating, rapid deployment of heat pumps is implausible under current conditions. Consumer resistance remains high, installer numbers are growing too slowly, and both capital and running costs are materially higher than for gas heating. Even where heat‑pump subsidies reduce upfront costs, households still face additional expenditure on larger emitters [eg radiators], pipework and insulation, as well as higher ongoing energy bills because electricity prices remain far above gas prices”. (In the report itself, Porter only suggests “uncertain running costs relative to gas”)
She ignores the facts that:
- Electricity prices are expected to be lower than gas prices in the long-term
- Electricity prices are likely to be less volatile than gas prices
Nevertheless, she is right to point out that rates of uptake of heat pumps in the UK are lagging behind required rates for Net Zero, and this is an area where stronger policy action is required to get things back on track.
10.7) Porter says:
“High electricity prices have driven deindustrialisation across large parts of the UK economy”
This draws on a fear that production and jobs are moving to other countries. In the pushback narrative, this is tied to claims of 'higher emissions' in other countries, because of their lower environmental standards and weaker (or non-existent) Net Zero plans.
Ways to address that pushback include proper carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments, making it a level playing field internationally, and leadership in Net Zero. That all encourages manufacturing production to take place in countries where it can be done with lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions. By mid-century, if we achieve Global Net Zero, all manufacturing production will be done without any GHG emissions, on a net basis, wherever it takes place in the world. If those supporting the pushback narrative, including Porter, want to stop such jobs in the UK going to other countries (or to "reshore them"), then they should be supporting carbon taxes and the acceleration of the achievement of Net Zero in the UK, and the implementation of Net Zero plans in other countries. I don't see Porter and her supporters doing that, which means that their use of their pushback narrative is likely to be political expediency and populism rather than a genuine line of argument.
10.8) Porter then claims:
“… over the next 5 to 7 years… [there will be a] capacity shortfall of around 12 GW [of gas] … Replacing or upgrading ageing gas generation is constrained by long lead times. New rotors [referring to key component parts of gas power plants] typically require around 5 years, and entirely new gas turbines 7-8 years”
She ignores the fact that:
- Solar, wind and batteries can be deployed a lot faster than fossil energies.
- 12GW is far less than the 185 GW total UK generating capacity expected to be in place by 2030 (Statista). It’s about 6%. Hardly the massive shortfall Porter is suggesting. Although Porter states that additional new gas generation would struggle to make up that difference, in any case solar and wind and batteries would be easier, quicker solutions to any anticipated shortfall. With her arguments for additional gas, Porter is ‘shooting herself in the foot’.
10.9) Porter raises an issue that “policymakers ignore real-world constraints such as fire risks associated with overnight operation of domestic appliances”. In her report, she says more:
“Less affluent consumers are overwhelmingly more likely to own older, cheaper and less safe appliances. Encouraging people to, for example, do laundry at night, exposes such people to a choice between leaving their appliances unattended, with the associated fire risk, or adopting nocturnal living.”
She is clutching at straws, I think, in an attempt at scaremongering. She presents no data on this matter, and does not provide a citation either.
10.10) Porter points out that:
“Batteries are energy‑limited and cannot cover prolonged stress events”.
That’s more scare-mongering.
No sensible and realistic large scale energy systems can cover prolonged stress events, such as large scale disasters or prolonged severe weather events. That’s why civil emergency response systems exist.
In any case, I have addressed the matter of long duration storage earlier in this text.
Interconnectors, hydro and other renewable tech is available in some geographies for providing long-term storage or otherwise smoothing peaks and troughs during long term adverse weather conditions for renewable generation, but risk of shortfalls is a genuine area of policy and technical debate that is useful to raise. UK NESO has a risk assessment project to analyse this:
SIF - Scenario for Extreme Events:
https://www.neso.energy/about/innovation/our-innovation-projects/sif-scenario-extreme-events-alpha
from Google AI:
“The UK's NESO SIF (National Energy System Operator Strategic Innovation Fund) "Scenario for Extreme Events" project develops a novel, whole-system energy model to understand vulnerabilities and improve resilience to low-probability, high-impact events like severe storms or pandemics, going beyond siloed network analysis to link electricity, gas, and other infrastructure for better investment decisions, aiming to quantify potential cost savings from avoided disruptions.”
According to Google AI:
“The UK National Energy System Operator (NESO) Scenarios for Extreme Events project, funded by the Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF), completed its Alpha phase in April 2024. The work developed a novel modelling approach to assess the impact of high-impact, low-probability (HILP) events on the Great Britain (GB) energy system.
Key Results and Findings
- Modelling Framework: The project selected Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) as the best framework to construct a system resilience model due to its ability to display complex, cross-sector information.
- Quantified Benefits: A prototype benefit model estimated that using this new approach to optimize resilience investments could lead to a 22% reduction in customer minutes lost from large events.
- Financial Impact: Based on initial modelling, the approach could deliver an estimated saving of £39 million per year by reducing the frequency and severity of electricity distribution faults.
- Whole-System Scope: Unlike traditional siloed models, this work spans both electricity and gas networks and identifies linkages to other critical infrastructure like water, telecoms, and transport.
- Strategic Integration: As of 2026, NESO is integrating these findings into long-term planning, including the Future Energy Scenarios (FES) and the Energy Resilience Strategy scheduled for publication in 2026.
- Technology Maturity: The project aimed to advance the resilience model from Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 2 to TRL 7 (prototype development in a relevant environment).
- Regulatory Compliance: The results support anticipated license conditions for NESO to provide proactive recommendations for improving GB energy system resilience.
The work was a collaboration between:
- NESO (formerly National Grid ESO)
- Met Office (providing climate and weather data)
- University of Strathclyde (academic research)
- Frazer-Nash Consultancy (modelling and systems engineering)”
10.11) In her report, Porter uses some scary-looking risk assessment numbers:
“… there is a 65-85% probability of regional electricity rationing or blackouts by 2030 and a baseline risk of 5-10% of one of these cascading into a full grid failure… A certain level of complacency at NESO, and within the regulator, Ofgem, suggests that the response to the first such capacity crisis will be sluggish, which elevates the risk of a full system blackout by 2030 to 20-30%.”
She doesn’t say what she means by “regional blackout” and how that relates to the current rates of power cuts, which already happen every year. See my blog post explaining that the rate of power cuts has reduced in the last decade as the percentages of renewables in the generating mix have increased:
https://planetarycfo.weebly.com/bloghome/uk-dno-performance-on-electricity-supply-reliability-has-improved-as-renewables-percentages-have-risen
Her main claim is 20-30% risk of a full system blackout by 2030.
What data does she offer to support her opinion on that? Essentially virtually none. She points to other countries where there has been some debate about the capacity requirements for gas generation going forward.
In her report, she explains how she got to her estimate. After talking about some general types of “stress event” she says:
“It is therfore reasonable to assume that at least one significant stress event where available firm supply plus interconnector imports is insufficient to meet demand without forced load reduction will occur between now and 2030. A probability range of 65-85% is credible.”
Just calling that finger-in-the-air estimate “credible” does not make it so. Porter’s analysis lacks rigour and data to support it.
However, Porter then builds on that estimate as follows (with my emboldening):
“Given this risk of regional blackouts, the risk of a nationwide blackout can be expressed as the product of (i) the chance that a system stress event (under cold, still winter weather conditions) occurs, and (ii) that once it occurs, NESO fails to contain it using demand control and other tools. Under an optimistic, “technocratic” assumption, NESO recognises the problem promptly and sheds load decisively. Assuming only 5-10% of major shortfall events escalate into cascading system failure, applying this to the 65-85% risk of regional blackouts implies a full blackout risk of roughly 3-7% by 2030.”
She then seems to turn “3-7%” into “5 – 10%” with little or no justification:
“A 5-10% risk that a regional shortage translates into a full system collapse again has to be inferred from system characteristics since again there are not enough empirical data for frequency-based probability.”
She then inflates the risk of full system blackout by building in some assumed incompetence at NESO:
“Under a more pessimistic behavioural assumption where NESO under-estimates the risk and is slow or reluctant to trigger load shedding, the probability of a cascading failure is higher, and plausibly 20-30%, which when combined with the regional blackout risk yields a 10-20% chance of at least one full system blackout [by] 2030.”
Her evidence for alleging NESO incompetence is anecdotal at best, and so there is little substantiation for her approximately tripling of an already dubious number to arrive at what she calls “plausible” 20 – 30% risk of cascading failure by 2030.
Despite her lack of formal analysis, lack of properly sourced and verified statistical data, lack of sensitivity analysis and lack of any independent review of her work on this, Porter makes the following sweeping conclusion:
“This makes further electrification actively undesirable under expected system conditions.”
10.12) Porter uses claims about risk of shortfalls in generating capacity to argue for the need for “firm capacity”, ie fossil fuels, rather than increases in renewables, batteries (and other storage) and interconnectors. Her argument is not convincing, but it is a useful alternative to have in the back pocket as a contingency idea.
Porter phrases the issue as “issues with reliable generation capacity”.
This is a frequently seen form of phrasing from people resistant to the expansion of renewable energies.
Google AI addresses this misleading phrasing quite well:
“Phrasing renewable energy as unreliable is a common talking point used by critics, but energy experts typically refer to it as "intermittent". This is a technical characteristic related to weather dependence, which is managed by modern grid management strategies.
The Core Argument: Intermittency vs. Unreliability
The argument that renewable energy is unreliable stems from the fact that sources like solar and wind power depend on natural conditions that are not constant.
- Solar panels only generate electricity when the sun is shining (not at night or during heavy cloud cover).
- Wind turbines require specific wind speeds to operate efficiently; their output fluctuates with wind patterns.
However, energy experts argue this is a misconception:
- Intermittency means the supply is variable but predictable with modern forecasting technologies.
- Unreliability would mean the output cannot be forecasted or managed, which is not the case.
Grid operators have always dealt with variability in energy demand and supply (traditional power plants also go offline for maintenance or failures). Modern energy systems manage the intermittency of renewables through several strategies:
- Diversified Energy Mix: Combining various sources (solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass) ensures that one source can compensate for another when needed.
- Energy Storage: Technologies like large-scale battery storage can store excess energy generated during peak production times and release it when generation drops (e.g., at night or during a lull in wind).
- Grid Modernization: Upgrades to smart grids, improved forecasting, and demand-response programs help balance supply and demand in real-time.
- System Resilience: A distributed grid with many renewable sources spread across a wide area is often more resilient to extreme weather events than a few large, centralized power plants.
In a recent blog post, I point out how UK energy system reliability has improved over the last decade, at the same time as renewable energy proportions of the generating mix have increased substantially:
https://planetarycfo.weebly.com/bloghome/uk-dno-performance-on-electricity-supply-reliability-has-improved-as-renewables-percentages-have-risen
10.13) In her summing up, Porter puts her main argument that:
“Net zero targets cannot be allowed to override public safety. Security of supply must once again become the foundational principle of UK energy policy.”
Here, she conflates energy system reliability (the risk of short-term power cuts, which has always been a risk in the UK’s energy system, but one that has been falling as renewables percentages have risen) with energy security, which is a much wider topic.
When it comes to security of supply, Porter claims “It is important to note that for security of supply, solar should be excluded, since peak winter demand occurs after sunset so there is zero contribution by definition.”
By ignoring the combination of solar, wind, energy storage, interconnectors and demand management (eg load shifting within a 24 hour cycle) her argument on security of supply is specious and over-simplistic, and basically wrong.
She does correctly point out that battery storage solutions currently installed are short-duration (hours) rather than days or weeks. But this is a fast developing technology field and longer-duration battery storage solutions are already in the pipeline for the UK, and are already implemented in some other countries. Porter ignores those actual advances and future potentials. I’ve addressed them earlier in this text.
10.14) Porter is right to highlight that, as the transition progresses, the remaining fossil fuel (gas) parts of the system will become less and less economic (eg with fixed costs becoming a greater concern as generating plant are operated more sporadically rather than continuously). Not only will this increase the effective costs of fossil energy, but it will increase operational risks of failure of ageing gas plants, especially during severe cold or low-wind weather events, which might also affect renewables like solar and wind at the same time. The power outages in 2021 in Texas during Storm Uri caused by insufficient winterisation of fossil fuel power plants comes to mind.
10.15) Porter summarises the risk of disorderly decline of the upstream UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) fossil fuel assets:
“In an orderly decline, UKCS production falls predictably, pipelines are rationalised, and alternative import capacity is scaled up. In fact, most production forecasts indicate a smooth decline profile over the coming years. This is unlikely in practice because forced decommissioning of offshore pipeline infrastructure would lead to a cliff-edge loss of capacity… unmanaged decline in gas infrastructure could increase security-of-supply risks even as overall demand falls.”
I agree with her, that managed decline of UKCS assets and supplies is an important issue. Unfortunately, it is buried somewhat by Porter’s many unsubstantiated anti-AGW and anti-Net-Zero claims and smokescreens with which she fills her reports, papers and posts. That’s a shame. Many people probably never get as far as reading her comments about managed decline because of that.
Porter’s suggested remedies for managed decline of fossil energies include altering financial incentive structures “…providing financial support to key pipelines that would support their economics even under lower throughput conditions, essentially removing the economic drivers for decommissioning”.
A better solution, in my view, would be to nationalise many of the remaining UK oil and gas assets in decline. It can be seen, by the example of the massive problems experienced in the USA with orphaned wells and other oil and gas assets, that the private sector is very poor at cleaning up after itself in sectors that decline and fold. Rather than allow that sorry story to repeat itself in the UK Continental Shelf, it would be better to tax oil and gas more heavily, to build up a national decommissioning fund, and then to bring the assets into public ownership and use the national decommissioning fund to pay for the inevitable decommissioning of those assets in a staged and managed way. At the same time, the decommissioning strategy could incorporate closing oil and gas assets in such a way that they could be re-opened by future generations. This could be necessary, after Global Net Zero has been achieved and the climate overshoot beyond 1.5 degrees has been reversed. Let’s not forget that, after AGW has been solved, the trends on global average temperature will return to a slight downward trajectory. Future generations might find themselves in the position of needing to resume fossil fuel burning to prevent further global temperature reductions. That is another reason to “keep it in the ground (for now)”.
Indeed, I suggest that my alternative recommendation is supported by Porter’s comment that “gas must be treated as a core strategic system asset rather than a residual fuel.”
10.16) Energy security is not all about the risk of blackouts from failures of old equipment or severe weather events. The more present and significant threat currently on the table is that of sabotage, or outright military attack, by belligerent nations that see us as an enemy, notably Russia.
And this is where fossil energy infrastructure (eg ocean platforms, pipelines, large generating plant) are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. Renewables, by comparison, are less vulnerable than fossil fuel assets, because they are more widely dispersed and they are cheaper and quicker to replace if damaged.
10.17) Porter is right to point out that some aspects of the electrification and decarbonisation transition in the UK are off-track. This has been pointed out by the UK CCC and others.
She’s also right to point out that:
“without substantial reform of electricity pricing and grid-cost recovery mechanisms, further electrification could accelerate de-industrialisation rather than support it… Without stronger policy interventions, electrification targets will be missed. ”
10.18) One point where she is a little disingenuous is in her comments about the reasons for high electricity prices. High UK electricity prices in recent years have not been caused by renewable energies. For a fuller explanation of this, see:
https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-why-expensive-gas-not-net-zero-is-keeping-uk-electricity-prices-so-high/
Having said that, the future transitional costs of updating grid infrastructure (much of which was going to be necessary anyway, even without Net Zero providing a strong driver of change) and reconfiguring it for the future mix of renewables, and nuclear and some residual gas, will involve big capital investment. There is much debate about how to square this with consumer electricity pricing and Net Zero while avoiding contributing to further deindustrialisation as much as possible.
Porter cites the AR6 round of bids in the UK, to support her claim that:
“… it is almost always cheaper to generate electricity with gas than wind and solar, once the full costs to consumers are included”.
She further says that:
“… dispatchable gas units are running fewer hours and recovering a smaller share of their fixed costs, even though they remain essential for keeping the lights on during periods of low wind. This raises the effective cost of renewables, because it becomes more expensive to secure the gas power stations needed to provide backup.”
There is a very different way of looking at this. Rather than placing the burden of transition costs (including grid upgrades and reconfiguration) onto the new renewables coming onto the grid, we should be placing the transition costs on the generation sources (fossil fuels) that caused AGW and therefore caused the need for the transition in the first place. Also, carbon is very much under-priced currently, so that fossil fuel energy is, in fact, even more heavily subsidised and supported than is publicly known, and therefore a lot cheaper than it should be. Setting a proper price for carbon would redress this imbalance significantly, and would further incentivise the switch from fossil energies to renewables.
10.19) Porter quite rightly uses Dover and its port as an example of issues with the existing UK grid:
“The electricity grid in the entire Dover area is at maximum use... Grid reinforcements that would allow the Port to increase its grid connection from 7 MW to 160 MW would require network upgrades across the southeast as far as London, at significant cost… [and grid] upgrades for Dover are years away.”
Also, as a more general comment, she says:
“Grid connection queues now stretch for years, and even where connections are available… Unless [various] structural issues are addressed, the promise of low-carbon electrified industry risks colliding with the practical limits of grid capacity and system stability… Without major transmission upgrades, which face long consenting lead-times, large amounts of renewable output will remain stranded during low-demand periods, and southern load centres will depend on ageing, overstressed circuits.”
10.20) Porter’s comparisons with other countries (Norway, Germany and the Netherlands) are interesting but not very persuasive in supporting her recommendations about the UK energy systems.
There are many differences in the situations of those various countries making comparisons difficult and sensible conclusions extremely difficult. For example, Norway does not plan to use nuclear, or large amounts of solar, but it does have high amounts of hydro and a strong wind resource. Germany has phased out its nuclear fleet. The Netherlands has historically been a significant producer and transit hub for natural gas. Each of the three countries has different mixes of renewables, storage, fossil energies and interconnectors, and they are different from the UK. Porter fails to make a convincing argument about how each of them provides evidence supporting her claims and recommendations about the UK energy system.
About Germany, Porter says:
“The regulator concluded that while security of supply can be maintained in the medium term, this is contingent on a substantial volume of new dispatchable generation being commissioned over the next decade. In its central scenario, Germany will require between 22 GW and 36 GW of additional controllable capacity by 2035 to offset the retirement of coal and nuclear units and the rising electrification of heat, transport and industry. This represents one of the clearest official acknowledgements yet that variable renewables alone cannot support Germany’s decarbonisation strategy.”
Again (as with the UK situation) Porter rests her case on an inferred dependency, rather than an explicit one. She does not cite or quote a credible German source for that inference. She just makes it herself without evidencing it. She could improve her argument by quoting credible sources about the energy system plans in Germany to support her arguments.
10.21) Ultimately, Porter’s main suggested solutions to the many genuine challenges she raises in relation to the UK energy system are to compromise the UK’s Net Zero ambitions and increase fossil fuel generating capacity (gas). That is not the only solution, and it is one that would risk locking in significant amounts of investment in what would later become “stranded assets”.
The problems she highlights are better solved by making improvements in the plans for grid updates and reconfigurations, aligning them more closely with the plans for the remaining switch to an energy mix that is almost all renewables, with a small amount of gas with CCS. Better policy measures are required to ensure the pace of decarbonisation in heating, transport and industry gets back on track with Net Zero 2050 goals. Such transitions are not easy, and the right balance of policies between mandates (such as quotas for EV percentages) versus free market mechanisms, is difficult to achieve. Mid-term targets for 2030 might well need to change, in response to the changing situation internationally and nationally on energy security, reliability and the availability of commercial, scalable storage tech.
10.22) Debates about such matters are important, and much of Porter’s report tackles such matters well, in a descriptive way. However, her main conclusions and recommendations, which essentially revolve around backtracking on Net Zero and investing in fossil fuels (gas) are ill-founded and unsubstantiated. There are better solutions to the problems she identifies. Doubling down on Net Zero, with improvements in public policies, is a better response, and better evidenced, than her solution of, essentially, giving up on it.
Her recommendations, based on her assessment of “non-trivial risk of widespread disruption” (her unsubstantiated and almost completely unevidenced risk of a full system blackout by 2030 of 20-30%) would, in the main, take the country in a different direction, and lock in much unnecessary investment into assets that would increasingly become stranded assets.
